（上海立信会计学院讲座）
报告人：安永红
时间：2019年7月3号周三下午1点
地点：浦东校区第五教学楼404室
主题: Government Procurement, Market Power, and Consumer Welfare: Empirical Evidence from the Infant Formula Market
报告人简介：
安永红，美国约翰·霍普金斯大学经济学博士，现为美国德州农工大学经济系副教授（终身教职）。主要研究领域为计量经济学，产业组织以及应用经济学，研究课题包括计量方法在拍卖、契约合同、电子市场、医疗保险、央行决策以及公共产品等方面的应用，研究主要集中在个人在复杂且具有风险环境下的决策过程。曾获哈尔滨工业大学航天海鹰奖学金，清华大学光华奖学金，约翰·霍普金斯大学优秀博士生奖学金，德州农工大学经济系优秀博士生授课教授以及优秀博士生导师称号。曾在《Journal of Econometrics》、《Journal of Business & Economic Statistics》、《RAND Journal of Economics》等顶级学术期刊发表论文12篇、工作论文7篇。受邀为Applied Economics, Biometrics, Economic Modelling, Econometric Reviews, Economics Letters,Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Econometrics, Journal of Industrial Economics, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Review of Economic Studies, Sinica Statistica等杂志匿名评审。
报告内容简介：
In the U.S. infant formula market, over one-half of the total sales are through the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program sponsored by USDA. The three major manufacturers (Abbott, Mead Johnson, and Nestle) compete in both non-WIC and WIC markets, and they bid a rebate of their national wholesale prices to serve WIC participants exclusively on the state level. Motivated by the fact that rebates are more than 80% of wholesale prices, we investigate how WIC (1) affects manufacturers' pricing strategies and leads to the substantial gap between the wholesale prices and the after-rebate prices, and (2) distorts the prices paid by the non-WIC consumers.
We find that manufacturers' marginal costs are much higher than what they charge for the WIC program. Nevertheless, winning a WIC contract is beneficial because serving WIC participants has a substantial spillover effect (increasing 31% of the demand from nonparticipants), and the manufacturer's loss from WIC participants are subsidized by the increased prices for nonparticipants. We further conduct counterfactual analyses to investigate the impacts of the competitive bidding of WIC program on non-WIC consumers. Our results show that WIC's competitive bidding increases prices of infant formula for non-WIC consumers.
在美国的婴儿配方奶粉市场，有超过一半的销售额是由农业部实施的“妇女、婴儿和儿童计划”（WIC计划）来资助的。3个主要的制造商（雅培、美赞臣和雀巢）同时在WIC计划和非WIC计划市场开展竞争，他们依照全国批发价来对WIC计划市场的折扣价进行竞标，由于折扣超过批发价高达80%，本研究考察如下问题：（1）WIC计划如何影响奶粉制造商的定价策略并导致了高额折扣。（2）WIC计划对非WIC计划市场奶粉价格的扭曲效应。
研究结果发现：奶粉制造商的边际成本远高于其向WIC计划的报价，但赢得WIC计划合同还会带来好处，原因是WIC计划参与者的购买具有溢出效应（非WIC计划参与者的需求会因此增加31%）；奶粉制造商因WIC计划的损失可由没有参与该计划的消费者所付的高价予以补贴。进一步进行反事实分析来探究厂商的WIC计划竞价对非WIC计划消费者的影响，结果发现其提升了非WIC计划消费者的配方奶价格。
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